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ABstrACt
In this paper, we empirically investigate the influence of several characteristics of firms on the extent to which Malaysian 
listed companies disclosed financial instruments during the voluntary and mandatory periods of MASB 24 (Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation) Standard. Following prior studies, we predict that larger and more profitable 
firms are more likely to disclose more information on financial instruments. We also hypothesize that strong internal 
control mechanisms, such as the existence of a risk management committee and audit quality, also result in higher levels 
of disclosure.  The sample consists of firms that were listed with the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia in 1999, 2000, 
2002, and 2003. This study employs a multiple regression analysis over 484 firm-years. Our results indicate that, on 
average, the disclosure quality among Malaysian firms is low before the period of mandatory disclosure. However, the 
level of disclosure appears to increase immediately after the issuance of the MASB 24. We also find that the existence of 
a risk management committee, firm size and leverage are positively associated with the disclosure quality of financial 
instruments. Finally, in general, the results indicate that the implementation of financial instrument disclosure standards 
influence firms, to some extent, to provide high-quality reporting.
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introduCtion
the use of complex derivatives products has increased in 
recent years (isdA 2007). A mid-year 2007 survey by the 
international swaps and derivatives Association (isdA) 
indicated the notional amount outstanding of global credit 
derivatives increased by 32% in the first 6-month of 2007. 
the global volume totaled us45.46 trillion by mid-2007. 
A mid-year 2007 survey by the international swaps and 
derivatives Association (isdA) indicated the notional 
amount outstanding of global credit derivatives increased 
by 32% in the first 6-month of 2007. The global volume 
totaled us45.46 trillion by mid-2007. the increase has 
enabled firms to better manage their exposures, but at the 
same time exposes them to greater uncertainties.  recent 
corporate collapses, both abroad and in malaysia, have 
heightened calls from regulators and standard setters for 
firms to increase levels of disclosures as stakeholders are 
concerned about the quality of financial reporting and the 
effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms within firms. In 
malaysia, transmile Berhad, a listed air cargo company, 
was reported to have accounting irregularities in overstating 
its revenues in 2004, 2005, and 2006 by rm622 million. 
transmile Berhad’s case has opened the door to further 
investigations of other listed companies in malaysia. 
investors have also broadened their risk assessments to 
include on and off balance sheet transactions, forcing 
firms to increase disclosure quality, especially when they 
seek external funding (Skinner 1996). Recent financial 
crises have resulted in substantial losses due to derivatives 
trading as part of hedging strategies for non-financial 
companies in many countries (dodd 2009). dodd (2009) 
estimates that in 12 countries, including Poland, nine Asia 
countries and two Latin America countries, the financial 
crisis affected possibly 50,000 firms with derivatives losses 
totaling approximately usd530 billion. The significant 
financial losses provide a strong justification to require 
firms to disclose their financial instrument information. 
this prompted standard setters such as the Financial 
Accounting standard Board (FAsB) to issue statement of 
Financial Accounting standards (sFAs) 119 Disclosure 
about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value 
of Financial Instruments, a more stringent disclosure 
standard, to replace sFAs 107 Disclosures about Fair Value 
of Financial Instruments (hassan, et al. 2006). sFAs 119 
was issued in 1994 and sFAs107 was issued in 1991 due to 
inadequate fair value information required by sFAs 119, the 
standard was later superseded by FAsB 133. sFAs 119 was 
issued to guide firms on disclosure of derivative financial 
instruments and fair value in the financial statements. 
however, sFAs 133 is more stringent where it requires 
firms to measure all derivative instruments at fair value 
and recognized in the statement of financial position 
either as assets or liabilities. Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities in 1998 (hassan et 
al. 2006). mandated disclosure requirements, such as 
FAsB 133, are expected to be useful for users of financial 
statements in their assessments of risks associated with 
derivatives transactions. 
 As disclosure quality of financial instrument 
information has become increasingly important in more 
developed economies, the malaysian Accounting standard 
Board (mAsB) has stepped up its efforts in improving 
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reporting quality of malaysian public listed companies. 
subsequently, in 2001, the accounting standard setter 
issued mAsB 24 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation, which was based upon the international 
Accounting standard (iAs) 32 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation.  mAsB 24 describes specific 
requirements for the disclosure of financial instruments, as 
well as specific information to be disclosed. This disclosure 
would help financial statement users to understand the 
importance of on-balance sheet items or off-balance sheet 
items in assessing a firm’s financial position, performance 
and cash flows. 
 the past several years have witnessed a growth in both 
disclosure and determinants of disclosure practices literature. 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) provide a very extensive review 
of literature which includes several country-specific studies 
on the firm-characteristic determinants of disclosure. 
Additionally, there is a growing body of literature that 
specifically attempts to link corporate governance structures 
within firms and the usage of derivative instruments and 
disclosure practices. however, the precise relationship 
remains questionable. For instance, marsden and Prevost 
(2005) fail to find any systematic relation between board 
composition and derivative usages of listed firms in New 
Zealand. similarly, lopes and rodrigues (2007) also fail 
to empirically prove the influence of corporate governance 
practices, including the board composition, on disclosure 
practices of Portuguese firms. These findings suggest that, 
in general, conventional corporate governance structures 
of a firm are not able to explain disclosure practices of 
financial instruments. Perhaps, a more specific mechanism 
or function within a firm’s governance structures is likely 
to provide more meaningful insight into disclosure of 
derivatives usage and risk management practices of firms. 
 empirical evidence suggests that a strong internal 
control should lead to more transparent disclosures 
(Chen and jaggi 2000; karamanou and Vafeas 2005). the 
supervisory and governance role of board committees is 
now increasingly recognized in reviews of the legislative 
frameworks of a number of countries, including the us 
and the uk. in particular, board committees, such as audit 
committees and risk management committees, fulfill a 
significant role in ensuring that financial information 
reporting is transparent and accurate; and that financial 
controls and systems of risk management are robust. For 
instance, the malaysian Code on Corporate governance 
states that a board of directors must maintain a sound 
system of internal control. subsequently, in may 2000, 
Bursa malaysia issued A Guidance on Statement of Internal 
Control which, among other things, emphasizes the need 
for listed firms to put in place a proper risk management 
mechanism and disclose firm-wide risk management 
practices applied within the respective firms (yatim 
2010). while there is positive movement to ensure high 
transparency practices, limited guidelines are available for 
Malaysian firms to ensure high-quality financial instrument 
information is disclosed. 
 until 2001, there was no specific accounting 
standard available to guide firms in reporting the financial 
instruments. iAs 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation was the first of two accounting standards 
issued by the international Accounting standards Board 
(iAsB). Although iAs was adopted in malaysia in 2001, the 
standards were not comprehensive. the iAs 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was the 
second accounting standard issued by iAsB, but was not 
adopted until early 2010.  the long delay of adopting iAs 
39 may due to the fact that the standard involves highly 
technical issues relating to fair value accounting. this 
requires managers to accumulate technical expertise to be 
technically competent (Carlin, Finch & laili 2009) before 
the standard may be adopted. the delay may also be due 
to fact that fair value may cause many companies to incur 
huge losses, which may lead to the poor performance of 
the companies due to volatility in the fair value of financial 
instruments, which might be due to change in their market 
value.
 Considering the less comprehensive disclosure 
requirements of financial instruments and the delay of 
adopting iAs 39 (disruption), we therefore question the 
quality of financial instrument information disclosed in 
financial statements prior to the issuance of the iAs 39 (i.e. 
within regime of mAsB 24). we also question factors that 
contribute to the adoption of mAsB 24 during this period. 
Therefore, this study aims to examine several firm-specific 
factors that are likely to influence the quality of financial 
instrument disclosures of Malaysian listed firms during the 
regime of mAsB 24 (which is based on iAs 32). in relation 
to this, the decision by malaysia to delay the adoption of 
iAs 39 represents an interesting opportunity to examine 
the impact of firm-specific factors on mAsB 24 prior to 
the adoption of iAs 39, which was modeled closely to 
the international Financial reporting standards (iFrs) 
(Carlin et al. 2009). these factors are important to provide 
evidence regarding the influence of firms’ characteristics on 
the adoption of accounting standards within a jurisdiction 
which is still in the process of development, particularly 
when compared with developed jurisdictions (Carlin et al. 
2009). 
 this paper contributes to the existing literature in 
several ways. First, the paper provides evidence on the 
disclosure quality of financial instrument information prior 
to and immediately after the adoption of the mAsB 24. 
investigation into this issue would add to our knowledge 
on firm characteristics and management behavior that 
have significant effects on disclosure practices under two 
distinct reporting regimes:  voluntary reporting regimes 
and mandatory reporting regimes. unlike norkhairul 
Hafiz (2003), this study expands disclosure practices to 
all financial instruments, including financial derivatives 
disclosures before and after the mAsB 24.
 second, we examine the association between our 
measure of disclosure quality and the risk management 
committee. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
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examines the role of risk management committees in 
determining the disclosure quality of financial instrument 
information. we believe the role of risk management 
committee (rmC) in managing risk, particularly with 
respect to financial instruments, will significantly affect 
the ways in which firms disclose their exposure to risks 
associated with the instruments. When firms establish 
rmCs, they demonstrate that they are systematically 
involved in risk mitigation and holistic management, hence 
they are likely to disclose more; and the management and 
board of directors of the firms are likely keen on dealing 
with risk management matters. lopes and rodrigues 
(2007) examine the role of corporate governance on 
financial instrument disclosure. However, in a similar 
fashion to many other disclosure studies, lopes and 
rodrigues’ study only examines the role of independent 
directors in financial instrument disclosure. 
 our results indicate that, generally speaking, the 
disclosure quality among Malaysian firms is low. However, 
the level of disclosure is increasing, especially in the 
period immediately after the issuance of the mAsB 24. 
our regression analysis indicates that the existence of a 
risk management committee is consistently related (with 
a positive direction) to the disclosure quality of financial 
instruments. Additionally, we find that the size of a given 
firm, as well as its ratio of debt to total assets, is associated 
with the disclosure quality of financial instruments. We 
believe this study provides important implications for 
standard-setters and regulators in developing and enforcing 
accounting standards. the issue is particularly relevant 
to malaysia since the country is still in the process of 
rapid development, which requires a significant amount 
of technically competent human capital or regulatory 
institutions (Carlin et al. 2009).
 the remaining sections of the paper are as follows. 
sections two and three discuss the institutional background 
and existing research respectively. section four develops 
the empirical predictions to be used in this study. 
Section five describes the methodology undertaken and 
results are presented in section six. our conclusions and 
recommendations are presented in section seven.
institutionAl BACkground
in the u.s., innovative derivative instruments are used 
by large corporations to reduce their exposure to a 
variety of risks (géczy, minton and schrand 1997). 
these innovative instruments are based upon four basic 
derivative instruments: forward contracts, future contracts, 
options and swaps. 
 investors have been alerted to the importance of 
transparent financial reporting with regard to risk and 
uncertainty. most accounting standard-setters have been 
forced to respond by requiring more disclosures. the 
FAsB in the united states is more advanced in regulating 
the accounting treatment of financial instruments when 
compared to the rest of the world. The first accounting 
pronouncement released by the FAsB pertaining to 
financial instruments was issued in 1990. However, in 
Malaysia, the accounting standard pertaining to financial 
instruments (mAsB 24) was not issued until 2001. 
the standard prescribes certain requirements for the 
presentation of on-balance sheet financial instruments 
and identifies the information that should be disclosed 
regarding both recognized and unrecognized financial 
instruments. The standard requires firms to 1) classify 
financial instruments into liabilities and equity; 2) classify 
related interest, dividends, losses and gains; and 3) explain 
the circumstances in which financial assets and financial 
liabilities should be off-set. 
 Firms are also required to disclose 1) factors that 
affect the amount, timing and certainty of an enterprise’s 
future cash flows relating to financial instruments; 2) 
the accounting policies applied to those instruments; 3) 
the nature and extent of an enterprise’s use of financial 
instruments; 4) the purposes of using financial instruments; 
5) the risks associated with the financial instruments; and 
6) the management’s policies for controlling those risks.
For the purposes of this study, the mAsB 24 is assumed 
to be a high-quality disclosure standard. this is a 
reasonable claim due to the extensive nature of the 
disclosure requirements. Therefore, firms that prepare 
their annual reports based on this standard are said to 
provide high-quality financial instrument information. 
Correspondingly, failure to comply with this standard 
suggests that financial instrument disclosures are of low-
quality. Although the standard is less comprehensive 
than iAs 39, it was developed based on the iAs 32. we 
acknowledge there are two more accounting standards (Frs 
7 Financial instruments: disclosure; and the Frs 9 Financial 
instruments) will be issued (which related to iAs 32 and 
39) after the establishment of the international Financial 
reporting standards. however, these two standards are 
still in progress and expected to be implemented in 2013 
(Frs7) and 2015 (Frs9), therefore discussion concerning 
these Frss lies outside the scope of the present article.
Prior reseArCh And hyPotheses deVeloPment
The term ‘quality’ has been used interchangeably with 
the term ‘transparency’.  Because the concepts of quality 
and transparency are elusive (kothari 2000), there are 
different interpretations concerning the meaning of 
‘high-quality’ financial information. In certain instances, 
‘quality’ is assessed based on the timeliness of economic 
income recognition in accounting income (Ball, robin 
and wu 2002; Ball, kothari and robin 2000; and lang, 
raedy and yetman 2003); the level of accruals (Bradshaw, 
richardson and sloan 1999); and evidence of earnings 
management and indications of a higher association 
of earnings with share price (lang et al. 2003). Ball et 
al. (2000) defined ‘timeliness’ as the extent to which 
current-period accounting income incorporates current-
period economic income. This definition is consistent 
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with lang et al. (2003) and Ball et al. (2002). however, 
following Pownall and schipper (1999), the current study 
defines financial information as ‘high-quality’ when it 
possesses the attributes of transparency, full disclosure and 
comparability. Therefore, we believe firms that comply 
with the mAsB 24 requirement can be regarded as providing 
high-quality disclosure information.
  Prior research examines the usefulness of financial 
information by investigating the extent of firm disclosures 
and the quality of accounting information disclosed in 
annual reports. studies that relate the level of disclosure 
to firm characteristics include Firth (1979); Cooke (1989; 
1991, and 1992); imhoff (1992); malone, Fries and jones 
(1993); Singhvi and Desai (1971); Heflin, Shaw and Wild 
(2001); and wallace and naser (1995). these studies 
provide evidence of the association between disclosure 
levels and firm characteristics, including firm size; listing 
status; firm auditor; the scope of business; risk of trading; 
and industry type. most of these studies utilize a disclosure 
index to measure disclosure level or disclosure quality.
 while the majority of the aforementioned studies 
examine the quality of all financial information disclosed 
in annual reports or other media, limited studies have 
documented disclosure quality in regards to specific 
information, particularly financial instruments. Four 
Australian studies on the quality of derivative disclosures 
were conducted by hassan et al. (2006-2007); Chalmers 
and godfrey (2004 and 2000); and Chalmers (2001). 
however, most of these studies (Chalmers and godfrey, 
2000 and Chalmers, 2001) examine disclosure quality 
under a voluntary disclosure regime. Chalmers and godfrey 
(2000) explore the disparity between the accounting 
treatment of derivative instruments, as encouraged by the 
1996 Australian Accounting standards Board (AAsB) 1033 
Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments, and 
the current accounting practices of firms, based upon the 
30 June 1998 financial statements of Australia’s 500 largest 
firms. The study indicates that the disclosure quality is less 
than satisfactory. 
 Chalmers (2001) examines Australian firm derivative 
instrument disclosures over three phases: a pure voluntary 
disclosure phase; a coercive voluntary disclosure phase; 
and a mandatory voluntary reporting period. the study 
examines the responses of firms to information demands 
in the changing regulatory environment between 1992 
and 1998. Chalmers utilizes a voluntary reporting 
disclosure index to capture derivative disclosures. the 
index is constructed using the disclosures suggested in 
the Australian society of Corporate treasurer’s industry 
statement and the exposure draft (ed) 65: Presentation 
and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. this industry 
statement was issued in March 1995 and requested firms 
to include information on derivatives in their financial 
statements. The results indicate that firms are responsive 
to quasi-contractual disclosure regulations, since the 
number of firms registering a positive voluntary reporting 
disclosure index increased from phase to phase. the release 
of the ed 65, combined with the increased development 
of relevant AAsB standards, is influential in achieving 
enhanced derivative instrument reporting. 
 Chalmers and godfrey (2004) expand upon the 
aforementioned studies by examining the voluntary 
disclosure practices from 1992 to 1996. this study provides 
evidence on factors that drive responses to voluntary 
derivative financial instrument disclosure regimes. They 
argue that a firm’s reputation and legitimacy is affected 
by its response to the new disclosure requirements. 
results from this study indicate that voluntary derivative 
financial instrument disclosure is associated with 
reputation considerations, including a firm’s affiliations 
with professional bodies, firm size, type of industry and 
the extent of its media attention.
 hassan et al. (2006-2007) extends these studies by 
examining the transparency of derivative disclosures 
among firms in extractive industries prior to the adoption 
of international accounting standards in Australia. the 
study examines the association between a measure of 
transparency and various firm characteristics. unlike 
the above two studies, hassan et al. (2006-2007) 
measures transparency based on the re-issued AAsB 1033 
Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments 
disclosure requirement. results from this study indicate 
that large firms and firms with high price-earnings ratios 
and debt-to-equity ratios provide more transparent 
derivative disclosures. 
 similar to our study, lopes and rodrigues (2007) 
examine the determinants of voluntary financial instrument 
disclosure among Portuguese companies. the study 
analyzes disclosures based upon an index developed 
according to the iAs 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure 
and Presentation and iAs 39 Financial Instruments: 
Measurement and Recognition requirements. the study 
provides evidence that size, type of industry and auditor 
listing status are significantly related to disclosure 
quality. 
 we adopt an approach similar to lopes and rodriques 
(2007) to measure disclosure quality. however, unlike 
lopes and rodriques (2007) our index is based solely 
upon the mAsB 24, which is the equivalent of the iAs 32. 
this approach is due to the impending of adoption iAs 39 
(iFrs 139) in malaysia. therefore, our study will provide 
evidence on management behavior which due to the 
flexibility of the disclosure of financial instruments. While 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) examined 55 listed firms 
in 2001, our study provides evidence on the disclosure 
practices of publicly-listed Malaysian firms before and 
after the mAsB 24 became mandatory. 
 in malaysia, norkhairul hafiz (2003) provides 
evidence relating to the association between the voluntary 
disclosure of derivative financial instruments and two 
specific firm characteristics: firm size and level of foreign 
activity. A disclosure index, based on the mAsB’s ed 24 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentations was 
used to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. the study 
provides evidence that the level of voluntary disclosure of 
derivative financial instruments is low, possibly due to the 
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lack of a control mechanism in malaysia. the study also 
provides evidence that the level of voluntary disclosures 
among companies with a high percentage of foreign 
subsidiaries is low when compared to companies with 
a low percentage of foreign companies. Furthermore, 
the study finds that there is no difference in the level of 
voluntary disclosure of derivative financial instruments 
with regard to companies with substantial foreign sales as 
opposed to those with a low percentage of foreign sales; 
nor is there an observed difference between companies 
with large assets and those with small assets. this is argued 
to be the result of conflicts of interest between management 
and stakeholders.
 while the present study acknowledges the contribution 
of Norkhairul Hafiz (2003); his study only focused on part 
of the ed 24 disclosure requirement. moreover, similar 
to the above Australian and Portugal studies, norkhairul 
Hafiz (2003) provides evidence on the level of disclosure 
before the standard become mandatory. therefore, the 
results might be biased towards certain firms that are more 
capable in terms of money and human resources. hence, 
further study is required to understand disclosure quality 
during mandatory regimes. therefore, the current study 
will expand upon results of the aforementioned studies by 
examining disclosure quality among publicly-listed firms 
in malaysia prior to and after the mAsB 24 was issued. 
most importantly, our study will provide evidence on 
the role of risk management committee to ensure high-
quality financial information is reported. Results from this 
study are important, since they constitute evidence on the 
disclosure quality among firms in a developing country in 
which compliance with accounting standards is not always 
rigidly enforced (hope 2003). 
   Financial instruments expose firms to financial, 
economic and operational risks. to reduce or eliminate 
the risks, firms may use derivative instruments (Hassan 
2004; géczy, minton and schrand 1997). however, due 
to their nature, derivative financial instruments also may 
expose firms to risks. Barings Plc.; Proctor and Gamble; 
and gibson greetings are among corporations that 
suffered significant losses due to the inappropriate use of 
derivatives (Hassan 2004). Since then, financial reporting 
has witnessed an increase in disclosure risk information in 
the u.s. and the uk. this is because the failure to appreciate 
risk issues may have serious consequences (Fraser and 
henry 2007). 
 Some firms may take a pro-active stance in protecting 
their investors by establishing effective internal controls 
and appropriate corporate governance. with good 
corporate governance practices, firms are expected to act in 
the interests of their shareholders. internal audit functions 
and internal audit committees are becoming increasingly 
frequent in risk management (Fraser and henry 2007). 
however, it is not clear whether these internal monitoring 
bodies are the optimal means of dealing with risk 
management issues (Fraser and henry 2007). in malaysia, 
the oversight of risk management and control activities 
is usually embedded within the internal audit functions. 
the internal audit function will subsequently report to 
audit committees about the firm’s internal controls and 
risks. A survey indicates that only 58 percent of malaysian 
firms have their own internal audit function (iiA malaysia 
2003).
 In addition to audit committees, some firms establish 
rmCs. similar to an audit committee, the rmC ensures that 
management is not too involved in high-risk activities 
and also ensures that firms provide high-quality financial 
instrument information in their annual reports. generally, 
from an agency theory perspective, the purpose of 
the committee is to act on behalf of shareholders in 
assisting firms to understand and manage risk. The rmC 
also monitors the management involvement in high 
risk activities that would affect the firm’s objectives, 
alerting management when such activities include an 
unacceptable degree of risk. however, compared to an 
audit committee, the establishment of a rmC within a 
firm shows a concerted effort to address risk issues. The 
rmC will be more proactive in planning a continuous 
process that identifies, measures, and manages risk in the 
firm. The focus of overall governance in a firm is now 
becoming broader, from legal and regulatory compliance 
to firm-wide business risk management (Power 2000; 
yatim 2010). therefore, this committee has the obligation 
to provide proper disclosure about the risk of financial 
instruments and derivative contracts to shareholders, to 
whom they are accountable. disclosure about the risk 
of financial instruments and derivative is also a way to 
manage business risk. Without proper disclosure, the firms 
face non-disclosure risks that may lead to the initiations of 
formal litigation proceedings by investors. 
 Furthermore, the rmC is able to direct the identification, 
prioritization and management of risk, as well as support 
internal audit functions, of the audit committee (Fraser 
and henry 2007). we expect the quality of financial 
instrument disclosure in firms with rmCs is higher than in 
firms without such committees. This is because the rmC 
oversees and controls various risks faced by the firm, 
hence the financial reporting quality is greatly enhanced 
(yatim 2010). research on rmC is scarce because, in most 
circumstances, the role of risk management falls under the 
jurisdiction of the audit committee. however, yatim (2010) 
suggests that the establishment of a risk management 
committee in malaysia is not only associated with strong 
board structure, the size of the firms and the complexity 
of a firm’s operations, but also the use of one of the Big 4 
audit firms which have been associated with high-quality 
disclosure. As rmCs have been reported to be associated 
with strong board structure (yatim 2010), we believe the 
committee will influence managers to provide high-quality 
disclosure of financial instruments. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is:
h1: the quality of financial instrument information 
disclosed in the annual report is positively associated 
with the existence of a risk management committee 
(rmC) within the firm. 
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 one characteristic that has been extensively related to 
disclosure policy is firm size. There are many reasons why 
large firms might disclose more information (Cooke 1991). 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) indicate that larger firms are 
expected to provide more transparent information, as they 
incur lower costs of accumulating detailed information, 
have more marketable securities and have a greater ease 
in obtaining financing. In addition, larger firms tend to 
provide greater transparency to reduce political costs 
(Cooke 1989). Cooke (1989; 1991); Firth (1979); singhvi 
and desai (1971); wallace, naser and mora (1994); 
wallace and naser (1995); Ahmed and nicholls (1994); 
riahi-Belkaoui (2001); Ali, Ahmed and henry (2003); 
Norkhairul Hafiz (2003); Chalmers and Godfrey (2004); 
hassan et al. (2006-2007); and lopes and rodrigues 
(2007) provide evidence that firm size is positively 
associated with disclosure level or high disclosure quality. 
Therefore, we expect that large firms will disclose high-
quality financial instrument information. This leads to our 
second hypothesis:
h2:  the quality of financial instrument information 
disclosed in the annual report is positively associated 
with size of the firm. 
 Prior studies also provide evidence that firm 
performance also affects disclosure quality. A profitable firm 
may provide more detailed information to communicate 
good news to investors in order to improve firm value (Ali 
et al. 2003) and boost management compensation (wallace 
et al. 1994). however, while Ali et al. (2003) provides 
evidence of a positive relationship between profitability 
and compliance level, wallace and naser (1995) identify 
a negative relationship between these variables. however, 
more relevant to the current study, hassan et al. (2006-
2007) demonstrates that high-performance extractive 
firms provide more transparent, and thus higher-quality, 
derivative disclosure. Based upon the aforementioned 
studies, we expect high performance firms will provide 
a high-quality of financial instrument information. 
therefore, our third hypothesis is:
h3:  the quality of financial instrument information 
disclosed in the annual report is positively associated 
with firm performance. 
 Auditors play an important role in determining the 
quality of information disclosed by their clients. According 
to jensen and meckling (1976) and watts and Zimmerman 
(1983), a high-quality audit process will reduce agency 
conflict between the agents and the principals. large 
auditing firms appear to be associated firms with substantial 
agency costs and high-quality reporting. deAngelo (1981) 
and Fama and jensen (1983) indicate that this is because 
large audit firms tend to have many clients and have an 
incentive to maintain their independence from clients. 
Therefore, such audit firms tend to report mis-statements, 
as well as non-compliance, regarding mandatory reporting 
requirements. moreover, the reputations of large auditing 
firms are diminished when their clients provide low-quality 
annual reports (Ali et al. 2003; Chalmers and godfrey 
2004); when they commit fraud; or when they mislead 
stakeholders by asking auditing firms to certify their 
annual reports (owusu-Ansah 1998). the best example 
on this point is the collapse of Arthur Anderson, enron’s 
auditing firm. Therefore, larger auditing firms tend to 
pressure their clients to provide high-quality information. 
however, empirical studies have shown inconclusive 
results regarding this relationship. singhvi and desai 
(1971); Ahmed and nicholls (1994); wallace and naser 
(1995); and lopes and rodrigues (2007) found that size 
of auditing firms is positively associated with disclosure 
levels. However, no significant association is documented 
in Firth (1979); malone at al. (1993); wallace et al. (1994); 
Ali et al. (2003); and hassan et al. (2006-2007). we believe 
that large auditing firms have the necessary expertise 
relating to financial instrument disclosure and therefore 
may require firms to provide high-quality disclosure of 
financial instrument information. Therefore, our fourth 
hypothesis is:
h4: the quality of financial instrument information 
disclosed in the annual report is positively associated 
with the size of the auditing firm. 
methodology
sAmPle seleCtion
Our sample includes firms that were listed on the main 
board of Bursa malaysia in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003. 
Concerns regarding the use of outdated data in this 
study are understandably valid. nevertheless, the data 
is important and relevant to the context of the study. 
irrespective of the period considered in this study, little 
has changed with respect to the requisite information for 
disclosure requirements mandated in mAsB 24 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation and Frs 132 
Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure. 
Based upon our examination of both standards, we find that 
three major differences exist between these two standards. 
First, Frs 132 requires companies to disclose more 
information on hedges and risks involved, whereas mAsB 
24 requires firms to disclose hedging policies of major 
transactions. second, Frs 132 mandates firms to disclose 
fair value and provide explanations as to why fair value 
cannot be reliably measured, while mAsB 24 requires firms 
to disclose fair value of financial instruments if the value 
can be reliably estimated. third, Frs 132 requires further 
disclosures in other specific areas, including information 
regarding derecognition; collateral; financial instruments 
with multiple embedded derivatives; impairment; and 
default breaches.  in general, the information required for 
mandatory disclosures in the Frs 132 standard is included 
in the mAsB 24 standard, with the exception of the fact that 
Frs 132 requires enhanced disclosures on this information. 
  19
therefore, for the purpose of the present study, the outdated 
data used in this study does not jeopardize qualitative 
or quantitative results and conclusions drawn from said 
results. Financial data was gathered from datastream. in 
instances where data was unavailable from datastream, we 
referred to the annual reports of the respective firms. We 
selected the years of 1999 and 2000 to represent the period 
prior to the issuance of mAsB 24, while the years of 2002 
and 2003 represent the period after the issuance of mAsB 
24. There were 203 firms listed on the main board of Bursa 
malaysia in 1999. Accordingly, the same companies are 
represented in the samples from 2000, 2002 and 2003. the 
sample was further reduced by excluding companies that 
1) are not in datastream’s list and have no available annual 
report; 2) that have changed their financial reporting date; 
and 3) that have no available or incomplete data. table 1 
summarizes the sample selection procedure.
disClosure QuAlity
Financial statement users employ several techniques when 
evaluating accounting information. these techniques may 
include an assessment of information quality (imhoff 1992). 
Prior studies have measured quality based upon corporate 
disclosure practices provided by the Financial Analysts 
Federation (FAF) and the Association for investment 
management and research (Aimr). studies have also used 
a self-constructed disclosure index developed based upon 
voluntary and/or mandatory disclosures. 
 in this study, we measure quality based upon an 
unweighted index that utilizes information required by 
the mAsB 24. the index is classified based upon the 
seven categories of information required by the mAsB 24 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation. the 
mAsB is responsible for developing and promulgating 
approved standards. once an mAsB standard becomes 
an applicable accounting standard, firms are expected to 
comply with its requirements. For the purposes of this study, 
the mAsB 24 is assumed to be a high-quality disclosure 
standard since it is based on the standard issued by the iAsB, 
a set of internationally-accepted accounting standards. this 
assumption is reasonable because of the extensive nature 
of the mAsB 24’s disclosure requirements, which were 
designed to address the lack of guidance with regards to 
financial instrument (Hassan 2004). Appendix 1 presents 
the information required by the mAsB 24, which in turn 
forms an index of disclosure for financial instruments. 
 We examine financial statements to develop our index. 
we group information into seven components, namely  1) 
the disclosure of risk management policies information; 2) 
terms, conditions and accounting policies information; 3) 
interest rate risk information; 4) credit risk information; 5) 
fair value information; 6) hedge of anticipated transactions; 
and 7) other disclosures. A score of 1 is assigned to the 
item of each component disclosed, otherwise 0 is assigned. 
similar to hassan et al. (2006-2007) and lopes and 
rodrigues (2007), we divide the component score by the 
number of items in that component so that each component 
score contributes equally to the total score (Cooke 1991). 
then, we divide the total score for each firm by the 
possible score to represent disclosure quality. however, 
in a case where the information is not relevant, firms are 
not penalized for not disclosing information. therefore 
the denominator for the disclosure index will be adjusted. 
disclosure quality (dQ) is thus measured:
 
indePendent VAriABles
the existence of a rmC represents a corporate governance 
characteristic. this is relevant to the present study since 
this committee ensures that management is not too 
involved in high-risk activities and also seek to ensure that 
firms provide high-quality financial instrument information 
in their annual reports. this is because the monitoring 
mechanism will include a stringent risk management 
procedure (yatim 2010). we measure rmC based on a 
dichotomous variable. 
 Firm size has been found to consistently relate to 
disclosure policy (example, Chalmers and godfrey 2004; 
hassan et al. 2006-2007; lopes and rodrigues 2007). 
Following prior studies, log transformation of total assets 
is used to measure size. Firm performance has also been 
identified as a factor impacting disclosure quality (e.g. 
Ali et al. 2003; hassan et al. 2006-2007).  Consistent with 
previous studies, we use profit before tax over total assets 
(PtA) and the price-earnings ratio (Pe) to proxy for firm 
performance. the former measures current performance, 
while the latter provides a me asure of the market’s 
perception of a firm’s expected future performance. Similar 
to prior studies, the size of the auditor is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by a 
tABle 1. summary of sample selection Procedure
selection criteria No of firm-year
Listed firms on the Main Board
- Firms that change financial reporting date
- Firms that are not in the datastream and for which annual reports are not available
- Firms with data not available or for which data are incomplete
812
10
85
233
Total number of firm-year used in study 484
Note: There were 203 firms listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia in 1999. Accordingly, the same company is represented in the sample in 2000, 2002 and 2003. 
Therefore the total sample for this study is 812 firm-year.
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Big 4 auditor (Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, deloitte touche 
tohmatsu, ernst and young and kPmg); 0 if otherwise. 
we also include two additional variables to our regression 
analysis: a dichotomous variable that represents the effect 
of the disclosure practice before and after the mAsB 24 
(yrafter); and the debt-to-total-assets ratio (dtA) to 
represent leverage. we include dtA as a control variable, 
since prior studies (Ahmed and Courtis 1979; malone et 
al. 1993; hassan et al. 2006-2007) have indicated that 
firms with high leverage tend to disclose greater financial 
information. 
 we examine the association between the quality of 
financial instrument disclosure and firm characteristics 
using the model specified in Equation 1:
 DQ = α0 + α1Size + α3PTA + α4PE + α5DTA +
  α6Audit + α7RMC + α8YRafter + ε (1)
where
Size = log of total assets
PTA = Profit before tax over total assets
PE = Price earnings ratio
DTA = debt to total assets ratio
Audit = Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited 
  by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC = Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with rmC, 
  0 if otherwise
YRafter = dichotomous variable (1 to represent year 
  after 2001, 0 if otherwise)  
ε = error term
results
desCriPtiVe results
Disclosure Quality  table 2 presents the average disclosure 
quality results for the period under study. on average, the 
disclosure quality of financial instrument information is 
low. Column 6 of table 2 indicates that the level of quality 
in disclosure (hereinafter called the level of disclosure) is 
33.49%. however, the level of disclosure increased from 
25.67% in 1999 to 58.88% in 2003. this indicates that the 
level of disclosure among Malaysian firms was low before 
the standard become mandatory. table 2 also indicates 
that, on average, there is a steady increase in the level of 
disclosure for each component of information required by 
the mAsB 24 after the standard became mandatory. 
 Comparing each component, the results reveal 
that Malaysian firms tend to disclose more information 
regarding terms, conditions and accounting policies; and 
interest rate risk. on average, the level of disclosure for 
each component is 91.17% and 87.09%, respectively. 
the level of disclosure for information pertaining to 
terms, conditions and accounting policies increased from 
84.30% (in 1999) to 98.55% (in 2003). this item’s score 
is higher than the other items required by the mAsB 24 
and is followed closely by interest rate risk information, 
which increased from 73.97% (in 1999) to 97.93% (in 
2003). Comparatively, the level of disclosure for each 
item increased dramatically in 2003 above dQ, with the 
exception of credit risk information (42.6%); hedge of 
anticipated transaction information (15.21%); and other 
disclosures information (25.62%). the relatively lower 
level of documented hedge of anticipated transaction 
information may be due to the fact that the number of 
malaysian firms that actively hedge their anticipated 
transactions is low or non-existent because malaysian 
firms are not ready to take risks in such activities. While the 
level of disclosure for other information steadily increased 
from 1999 to 2003, our study indicates that the level of 
fair value information decreased from 16.40% (in 1999) 
to 16.34% (in 2000). however, it dramatically increased 
from 50.72% (in 2002) to 68.24% (in 2003).
Descriptive Statistics.  table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
Table 3 indicates that the level of quality of financial 
instrument disclosure among Malaysian firms is 33.49%. 
however, the highest score of disclosure is 97.14% and 
the minimum is 3.57%. this indicates that malaysian 
firms are generally not ready to provide high-quality 
financial instrument information. Therefore, regulators 
have to actively play their role to educate managers on 
how to comply with the standards’ requirements to increase 
confidence among stakeholders, especially the investors 
and market participants. 
tABle 2. mean disclosure Components
1999 2000 2002 2003 Pooled
sample 121 121 121 121 484
disclosure Quality of Financial instruments
disclosure of risk management Policies information
terms, Conditions and Accounting Policies 
information
interest rate risk information
Credit risk information
Fair Value information
hedge of Anticipated transaction
other disclosures
0.2567
0.0289
0.8430
0.7397
0.0000
0.1640
0.0198
0.0017
0.2925
0.0455
0.9008
0.8512
0.0289
0.1634
0.0281
0.0298
0.4840
0.5372
0.9174
0.9132
0.2975
0.5072
0.1339
0.0793
0.5888
0.6405
0.9855
0.9793
0.4256
0.6824
0.1521
0.2562
0.3349
0.3110
0.9117
0.8709
0.1880
0.3793
0.0835
0.0917
  21
tABle 3. descriptive statistics
mean median maximum minimum std deviation
DQ
Size
PTA
PE
DTA
RMC
Audit
YRafter
0.3349
20.4722 
0.0590
26.1406
0.3881
0.2231
0.7438
0.5000
0.2857
20.3641
0.0417
8.1804
0.3547
0.0000
1.0000
0.5000
0.9714
24.3034
4.4149
3500.000
4.1225
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0357
17.6478
-1.0918
-865.2174
0.0009
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1760
1.1724                           
0.2327
209.1645
0.2990
0.4168
0.4370
0.5005
where:
DQ =  disclosure quality
Size =  log of total assets
PTA =  Profit before tax over total assets
PE =  Price earnings ratio
DTA =  debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
YRafter =  dichotomous variable (1 to represent year after 2001, 0 if otherwise)  
tABle 4. Pearson Correlation matrix
DQ Size PTA PE DTA RMC Audit YRafter
DQ 1.000
Size 0.191** 1.000
PTA 0.034 0.002 1.000
PE -0.016 -0.030 -0.013 1.000
DTA 0.159** 0.041 -0.017 -0.001 1.000
RMC 0.308** 0.101* 0.013 0.026 -0.064 1.000
Audit -0.001 -0.070 -0.056 -0.016 -0.030 0.008 1.000
YRafter 0.343** 0.040 -0.050 0.014 -0.130** 0.526** -0.076 1.000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
where:
DQ =  disclosure quality
Size =  log of total assets
PTA =  Profit before tax over total assets
PE =  Price earnings ratio
DTA =  debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
YRafter =  dichotomous variable (1 to represent year after 2001, 0 if otherwise)  
Correlation Matrix.   table 4 reports the Pearson correlation 
matrix for dependent and independent variables. table 4 
indicates that dQ, size, PtA, Pe, dtA and rmC are correlated 
with at least one other variable. nevertheless, the highest 
coefficient recorded is 0.526 between rmC and yrafter. 
this suggests that multi-collinearity is unlikely to be 
a major problem. this is followed by the correlation 
coefficient for dQ and yrafter (0.343).
multiPle regression results
table 5 presents the results for the regression analysis 
of the association between disclosure quality and firm 
characteristics. unless otherwise indicated, the regression 
results are based on white’s (1980) heterocedasticity-
Corrected standard errors due to the presence of 
heterocedasticity. our study indicates that firm rmC, 
firm size and dtA are significantly related to financial 
22 
instrument information disclosure quality, with p < 0.001. 
The significance of rmC indicates that our study supports 
h1. this result indicates that the rmC plays an important 
role in ensuring that management and/or firms provide 
high-quality financial instrument information in their 
annual reports. hence, indicating that the existence of a 
rmC as a monitoring body of a firm’s risk strengthens the 
good governance of the firm. Therefore, this study supports 
the establishment of rmC to improve the effectiveness of 
firm systems operation (Fraser and Henry 2007). 
 table 5 also indicates that firm size is positively 
related to disclosure quality and is highly significant at p 
< 0.001, thus confirming H2. This indicates that large firms 
tend to disclose more financial instrument information 
as compared to small firms. This is consistent with prior 
studies by wallace and naser (1995); riahi-Belkaoui 
(2001); and Ali et al. (2003), as well as more recent studies 
by hassan et al. (2006-2007) and lopes and rodrigues 
(2007). As discussed in the context of agency theory, this 
may due to the tendency of large firms to incur lower 
information processing costs, as well as higher political 
costs, thereby encouraging them to disclose greater 
information. Additionally, our study also indicates that 
firms with high dtA tend to disclose high-quality financial 
instrument information. this is consistent with Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999), malone et al. (1993) and hassan et 
al. (2006-2007), it also appears that h3 and h4 are not 
supported. 
 time may play an important role in influencing 
disclosure behavior. therefore, we have extended the 
above results by including a dummy variable for year 
to represent the year after and the year before the mAsB 
24 became mandatory. we include yr after in the above 
estimation; note that 1 represents years 2002 and 2003 
(i.e., after the mAsB 24 become mandatory); otherwise 
it is 0. We predict that the disclosure quality of financial 
instrument information is influenced by the time at which 
the accounting standard was issued. table 6 presents 
the results for equation 1. our study indicates that the 
disclosure quality of financial instrument information is 
significantly related to period after the mAsB 24 was issued. 
This result indicates that firms tended to disclose high-
quality financial instrument information after the standard 
became mandatory. table 6 also presents results similar to 
table 5, as size and dtA are positively related to disclosure 
quality at p < 0.001. nevertheless, rmC is consistently 
positively related to disclosure quality at p < 0.05. 
sensitiVity AnAlysis
Ranked Regression.   we have taken several steps to 
ensure that all assumptions are met. nevertheless, our 
residuals for regression results presented in tables 5 and 
6 are not normal, despite some transformations to the non-
normal variables. however, we believe that the results are 
acceptable, since kurtosis and skewness are almost equal 
to 3 and 0 respectively. however, as conducted in prior 
studies, we also perform non-parametric estimations on 
our sample. we repeat the regression analysis utilizing the 
ranked regression procedure used by lang and lundholm 
(1993); wallace et al. (1994); owusu-Ansah (1998); Ali et 
al. (2003); and hassan et al. (2006-2007). similar to the 
above studies, we replaced the continuous variables (size, 
PtA, Pe and dtA) with their rank. results for this analysis 
are presented in tables 7 and 8. tables 7 and 8 indicate 
that the ranked regression results are consistent with the 
results presented in tables 5 and 6. 
tABle 5. results of regression Analysis of the Association between disclosure Quality and Firm Characteristics (n=484)
Coefficient std. error t-statistic Prob
Constant -0.2113 0.1363 -1.5499 0.1218
Size 0.0231 0.0067 3.4698 0.0006**
PTA 0.0247 0.0228 1.0823 0.2797
PE -1.52e-05 3.59e-05 -0.4244 0.6714
DTA 0.1017 0.0274 3.7111 0.0002**
RMC 0.1284 0.0222 5.7761 0.0000**
Audit 0.0057 0.0162 0.3547 0.7230
r2 0.1519 Adjusted r2 0.1412 durbin-watson stat 0.7377 F-statistic 14.2374 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000         
** indicates significance at p < 0.001. The t-statistics are based on White Heteroscedasticity Standard Errors.
where:
Size =  log of total assets
PTA =  Profit before tax over total assets
PE =  Price earnings ratio
DTA =  debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
YRafter =  dichotomous variable (1 to represent year after 2001, 0 if otherwise)
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tABle 6. results of regression Analysis of the Association between disclosure Quality and Firm Characteristics (n=484)
Coefficient std. error t-statistic Prob
Constant -0.2756 0.1347 -2.0453 0.0414
Size 0.0237 0.0065 3.6267 0.0003**
PTA 0.0385 0.0242 1.5921 0.1120
PE -1.46e-05 3.14e-05 -0.4652 0.6420
DTA 0.1187 0.0274 4.3271 0.0000**
RMC 0.0648 0.0267 2.4245 0.0157*
Audit 0.0159 0.0161 0.9840 0.3256
YRafter 0.1012 0.0178 5.6924 0.0000**
r2 0.2101 Adjusted r2 0.1985 durbin-watson stat 0.7170 F-statistic 18.0892 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
** and * indicate significance at p < 0.001 and p < 0.05, respectively.
where:
Size =  log of total assets
PTA =  Profit before tax over total assets
PE =  Price earnings ratio
DTA =  debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
YRafter =  dichotomous variable (1 to represent year after 2001, 0 if otherwise)  
tABle 7. results of regression Analysis of the Association between disclosure Quality and Firm Characteristics:  
ranked transformation (n=484)
Coefficient std. error t-statistic Prob
Constant -0.1077 0.0769 -1.3998 0.1622
NSize 0.1748 0.0442 3.9577 0.0001**
NPTA 0.0352 0.0465 0.7563 0.4498
NPE 0.0160 0.0412 0.3883 0.6980
NDTA 0.2116 0.0400 5.2840 0.0000**
RMC 0.5071 0.1193 4.2510 0.0000**
Audit -0.0072 0.0914 -0.0788 0.9373
r2 0.1312 Adjusted r2 0.1203 durbin-watson stat 1.0199 F-statistic 12.0046 Prob(F-statistic) 0. 0000
** indicates significance at p < 0.001.
where:
NSize =  ranked size
NPTA =  Ranked Profit before tax over total assets
NPE =  ranked Price earnings ratio
NDTA =  ranked debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
ConClusion
in this study, we examine the role of the rmC on the 
disclosure quality of financial instrument information 
among Malaysian firms listed in Bursa Malaysia. Our 
study indicates that the score of disclosure quality among 
malaysian firms is still low (33.5%). Comparing the 
two periods (voluntary and mandatory), the disclosure 
quality of financial instrument information is less than 
30% in practice during the voluntary regime, which is 
well understood. however, the disclosure level appears 
to be increasing during the mandatory period (48.4% and 
58.9%). The findings indicate that effective enforcement 
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tABle 8. results of regression Analysis of the Association between disclosure Quality and Firm Characteristics: 
ranked transformation (n=484)
Coefficient std. error t-statistic Prob
Constant -0.2743 0.0832 -3.2966 0.0011
NSize 0.1753 0.0438 4.0053 0.0001**
NPTA 0.0456 0.0453 1.0071 0.3144
NPE 0.0170 0.0409 0.4143 0.6788
NDTA 0.2447 0.0402 6.0900 0.0000**
RMC 0.2668 0.1426 1.8702 0.0621#
Audit 0.0309 0.0925 0.3341 0.7384
YRafter 0.3839 0.1033 3.7168 0.0002**
r2 0.1567 Adjusted r2  0.1443 durbin-watson stat 1.0367 F-statistic 12.6402 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    
** and # indicate significance at p < 0.001 and p < 0.10, respectively.
where:
NSize =  ranked size
NPTA =  Ranked Profit before tax over total assets
NPE =  ranked Price earnings ratio
NDTA =  ranked debt to total assets ratio
Audit =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 0 if otherwise
RMC =  Dichotomous variable 1 for firm with RMC, 0 if otherwise
YRafter =  dichotomous variable (1 to represent year after 2001, 0 if otherwise)  
mechanisms are important to ensure high-quality reporting, 
especially in developing countries such as malaysia. 
Among the types of information required by the standard, 
hedge of anticipated transaction information possesses 
the lowest disclosure quality, while terms, conditions 
and accounting information policies information possess 
the highest disclosure quality. our regression analyses 
indicate that rmC, leverage, size and the implementation of 
financial instrument disclosure standards are significantly 
related to disclosure quality. these results are consistent 
with prior studies. One of the significant contributions of 
our study pertains to the existence of the rmC as a corporate 
governance mechanism that plays a significant role in 
ensuring high disclosure quality. 
 one implication of this study is to suggest the 
establishment of a rmC within malaysian firms that 
would act on behalf of shareholders in managing and 
disclosing risk exposure relating to financial instruments. 
this is important, since a study by yatim (2010) indicates 
that the establishment of rmC is associated with strong 
board structures. Furthermore, the establishment of this 
committee indicates the commitment of the board of 
directors to improve internal control and to provide high-
quality information. As for regulators, such as malaysian 
institute of Corporate governance (miCg), security 
Commission and Bursa Malaysia, this findings can be 
used to justify for the requirement for firms to establish the 
rmC. however, more research on the composition of such 
a committee, member roles, and the specific procedures 
or processes that would enhance risk management are still 
needed. 
 while the study contributes to corporate governance 
literature, we acknowledge several limitations inherent in 
this study. First, the focus of this study is on disclosure 
practices during the voluntary and early mandatory periods. 
therefore, this limits our sample years (1999, 2000, 2002 
and 2003) and the relevant accounting standard. second, 
our study could be biased since we do not categorize 
firms that incorporate the role of rmC into internal audit 
functions as firm that possess established rmCs. Future 
research might extend this study to a more recent year 
and also incorporate an updated accounting standard. in 
addition, future research might also consider firms that 
incorporate the role of rmCs in the internal audit function 
as firms that possess established rmCs. 
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APPendiX 1
Components of financial instruments disclosure index
Reference Score
Disclosure of Risk Management Policies Information
Firm’s financial risk management objective & policies	
Objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments	
Para 49 & 50 1
Policy for hedging each major type of forecasted transaction	 Para 49 & 50 1
Component score 2
Terms, Conditions and Accounting Policies Information
a) Extent and nature of the underlying financial instruments, b) Significant terms and 	
conditions that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows.
Para 55(a) 2*
a) Accounting policies and method adopted, b) Criteria for recognition and basis of 	
measurement applied Para 55(b) 2*
Component score 4
Interest Rate Risk Information
Contractual repricing or maturity dates for interest rate risk	 Para 64 (a) 1
effective interest rates 	 Para 64 (b) 1
Component score 2
Credit Risk Information
The amount that best represents financial asset maximum credit risk exposure	 Para 74 (a) 1
Significant concentrations of credit risks for each class of financial assets	 Para 74(b) 1
Component score 2
 Fair Value Information
Fair value information for each class of financial asset and financial liability 	
(recognized and unrecognized). Para 86 1
when it is not practicable to determine the fair value (within the constraint of 	
time at cost), a) the fact should be disclosed with b) information about principal 
characteristics of the underlying financial instrument that are pertinent to its fair value
Para 86 2*
a) Method adopted and b) any significant assumptions made in determining fair value.	 Para 88 2*
Financial Assets carried at an amount in excess of fair value
the carrying amount and the fair value of either the individual asset or appropriate 	
groupings of those individual assets. Para 97 (a) 1
a) the reasons for not reducing the carrying amount, b) the nature of the evidence 	
that provides the basis for management’s belief that the carrying amount will be 
recovered.  
Para 97 (b) 2*
Component score 8
Hedge of Anticipated Transaction
a) A description of the anticipated transaction, b) the period of time until they are 	
expected to occur. Para 100 (a) 2*
A description of the hedging instruments.	 Para 100 (b) 1
a) Amount of any deferred or unrecognized gain or loss, b) the expected timing of 	
recognition as income or expense. Para 100 (c) 2*
Component score 5
Other disclosures
the total amount of change in the fair value of FA and Fl that has been recognized as 	
income or expense during the period under consideration. Para 103 (a) 1
the total amount of deferred or unrecognized gain or loss in hedging instruments 	
other than those relating to hedges of anticipated future transactions. Para 103 (b) 1
a) the average aggregate carrying amount during the year of recognized FA and Fl, 	
b) the average aggregate principal, stated, notional or other similar amount during the 
year of unrecognized FA and Fl, c) the average aggregate fair value during the year 
for all FA and Fl, particularly when the amounts on hand according to the balance 
sheet date are unrepresentative of amounts on hand during the year.
Para 103 (c) 3*
Component score 5
* A score of one is allocated for each item disclosed in the financial statements.
